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THE SUPERIORITY OF LAWYERS
By BERNARD C. GAVIT, Dean of the School of Law, Indiana
University
I
ONE of the older of the wise-cracks is to the effect that “Socialism
would be all right if it weren’t for the Socialists.” The effectiveness
and the truth of the remark are not greatly altered by substituting
any other movement or occupation and its adherents. Certain it is
that it is the human element in all social undertakings which consti-
tutes the grease on the pole of progress. Undoubtedly, therefore, it
strikes a peculiarly responsive note to paraphrase the wise-crack to
read, “Law would be all right if it weren’t for the lawyers.” Practi-
cally all lawyers are human, and they have an extremely dilhcult r61e
to fulfill. Their failures are both conspicuous and significant.
The real significance of the lawyer’s place in society deserves
more Pliblicity (outside cf Bar Association meetings) than it has
received. Most people do not appreciate their immediate interest in
the training and character of lawyers. There is only a slight under-
Standing of the truth that finally we have a government of judges.
It is Pel'fectly obvious that in no strict sense can we have a gOV-
emment of law and not of men. Government must be run by men
until our machine age reaches the delightful millennium when iron
mid snail can be endowed with brains and all of our problems SOIVed
“mom effort on our part. _ _
The idea sought to be conveyed by that Common dogma. 15 that the
me? Who run the government shall be guided not by the“ own pe-
cllllar notions of propriety, experience, and justice but by the. accut:
mulated experience of the past and the best thought and “5‘0" 0
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the present as it is embodied in constitutional utterances, “Cepted' an d
published principles of law, and a jud1c10us extensron of them to
meet changing needs. Ultimately under any governmental SYStun
there is government by men. That they should submit to TCStraints
is obvious, but that there should finally be a superior tribunal With
power to enforce the intended restraints is peculiarly and uniquely an
invention of the American constitutional system of government,
There is a vast distinction between our system and most others.
(In some of the newer republics our system has been copied.) In
most governments there is the same division of governmental func-
tions as in ours as between the executive, the legislature, and the
judiciary. There are also constitutional restrictions on the exercise
of governmental power in each field. But only under the American
system is it established that there is one of the three departments of
government which is finally superior to the others. Only under our
system is it established that the final determination of private and
public interests rests in the courts. For example, were Parliament
and the Crown in England to set up a National Recovery Adminis-
tration the only possible attacks upon it would be either revolution or
repeal. Under such a system the majority is always right.
It is a curious paradox, therefore, that in a so-called Democracy
we concede to our judiciary the power of thwarting even the ma-
jority. There is a review of all legislative and executive action in the
calmness, the objectiveness, the quiet of a judicial tribunal before
“trained” men. It has been thought, at least by the judges and law-
yers, that if final review on legislative, executive, and judicial is to
be given to anyone it could most properly be given to the judges.
And, being in a position to decide the matter, they have so decided~
The privilege of making a mistake is thus arrogated to the courts to
the exclusion of the legislature and the executive. It is not a facetious
statement but a provable truism that the judicial function is the power
to make mistakes—to decide a matter finally, rightly or wrongl)“
There ‘5 {10 logical and probably no practical compulsion to Sink
a0 2:51;“- (Witness the many governments which operate withou; :ch
laWyerrtgme Of the supremaCy of the courts has. arisen .Otlt 0“ to
his own Slfcepfatlce at its face value of his belief in or Oplnlenis not
the suprenFenomy' The matter which is continuously on t“ the sue
Periority ofafii, of the courts—that is established—but it 19 one egal Professmn. Finally the former must 1"“ .
latter, and it is just as valid, theoretically and practically. a
Gar/it: The Superiority of Lawyers 405
Those who are concerned with the maintenance of our present
system of constitutional government are in the last analysis really
concerned with the training and character of our lawyers. Even if
one were to wish a change, until the change can be accomplished he
too has an immediate interest in those matters.
It is true that the interest which all of us have in the training of
lawyers in so far as it affects our private interests is rather obvious
and has been sufficiently emphasized to need little reiteration. When
the reader employs an attorney he wants one who is intelligent,
learned, and honest. But if he is honest within the bonds of com-
mon decency, unfortunately the concern on that phase of his charac-
ter ends. As an advocate for your interests you might reasonably and
properly wish that he leave your adversary’s interests to his attorney
and the judge.
But when the attorney becomes legislator and executive and finally
judge, the concept of honesty and professional character broadens
and properly he considers not only your interests but those of your
adversary and society as a whole as well. He must not only be honest
With you; he must be honest with your opponent and the general
Public. The judging process is one of the noblest and certainly the
most difficult of human occupations, and it is perfectly apparent that
under our constitutional set-up all of us have a direct and immediate
interest in the learning and the character of our lawyers. The ulti-
mate success or failure of our experiment in Democracy depends
uPon him to a very large extent. In government there is no substitute
for learning, intelligence, and tolerance. Unless our lawyers possess
those characteristics we shall fail, and to the extent that they do 110t
have them we do fail.
II
.It is probably the judgment of those best qualified to express an
0PmiOn on the subject that our doctrine of the supremacy of the
Courts has worked reasonably well. There are notable instances
Where, however, the courts have blocked the path to social progress.
In suCh instances the judges demonstrated their inferiority. They
Wrote in bold letters their incapacity to deal with some legal prob-
ems. This has been particularly true in those instances where the,
ease Presented an assertion of social interests as against the then
Prevailing (and therefore past) judicial concept Of property interests.
v - .It is not difficult to discover the reasons for the failures. The pre-ailing legal philosophy for several hundred years has been a curious
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mixture of metaphysics, rationalism, theology, and dogmatism. Thom
cases were prejudged when those judges were trained. Taught phi-
losophy is tough philosophy, and few judges and lawyers trained
prior to the modern era escaped from the pattern set by their
schooling.
Lawyers have been taught to accept a number of supposed truths
which will not bear up under anything which resembles a critical
analysis. An element of sadness must attend us here, because the
acceptance has been so complacent.
Thus although the law frequently is called upon to distinguish
between a belief, an opinion, and knowledge, and the decision of some
cases actually turns upon the distinctions between them, lawyer phi-
losophy commonly fails to make the distinctions. It is true that in
common language the three terms are used somewhat synonymously.
But there is something to be gained by marking the differences
which a careful use of language does make.
One expresses a belief when he acts without regard to the facts.
He makes no pretense that what he says can in any sense be proved
by empirical evidence. An opinion, however, is a reasoned conclusion
or prediction from the available facts. It is worth just as much as
the evidence upon which it is based and the integrity and the intelli-
gence of the person expressing the opinion are worth. Knowledge,
however, presupposes that one is discussing observable facts and
that the personality of the author of the knowledge is eliminated in
so far as that is possible. I suppose that we may define a dogmatist
as one who expresses his beliefs and opinions in terms of “knowl-
edge.” How numerous are the things which all of us “know” WhiCh
are not so!
Even lawyers, too, make the common mistake of accepting con‘
cepts as things. Thus “the constitution” is an existing thing, when
in truth it is the sum total of the past and permissible future concepts
embodied in constitutional law. Likewise property, and even DemOC'
racy itself, are regarded in the same light. Such a philosophy neces-
sarily calls for a static social order, because reference is made to the
past experience as if it were the concept. Those people forget that
the concept Of Property may be made anything we wish to make it,
and that its formulation should be as objective as possible. We might
recall that it is an historical fact that the inhabitants of Cape Cod
resisted the erection Of 3- 1ighthouse there on the ground that it would
the wrecking bUSiness. One can appreciate their concern for
their existing business—but it is an obvious judgment that the in“?
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f hipownerS: sailors, shippers, and passengers very considerablyests O S
' d those of the ship—wreckers. . .
mfg: people forget too that Democracy after all IS Simply an
tt m t—and it should be an intelligent one and not a haphazard onea :0 1:hart and steer a course somewhere between narchy a d
granny. Any acceptance of past experience as being Democracy it-
self is a fatal mistake. It is at best simply a manifestation of that
experience, and the concept of Democracy is not wedded to it.
It is not surprising that large groups of people err in those re-
spects. Common philosophy and mental attainment cannot be ex-
pected to reach a considerable height. But a lawyer lives and works
in the realm of concepts and has learned something of the lessons
taught by the experiences of the past. Nevertheless it probably is
true that a considerable number of, lawyers believe in a constitution, ,
m a property and a Democracy each of which is static, because they
are dealing with things and not ideas, or they have never escaped
from the dogmatic content of the common law. They have accepted
::r:lt:t‘face value the vicious dogma that “a lawyer should be con-
Ratheiv: eise he 15 no 1awyer.”. Nothing could be more untrue.
“It takeseas Quid accept the late Will Rogers’ dictum to the effect that
pend all of we man to. differ With me.” If the lawyer ought to ex-
3 energies in defense of the status quo, then by the same
SlgnTSICIIJUght the doctor,- the chemist, and all scientists.
Sumed thalts 1another failing Which is peculiarly lawyer-like. It is as-
Problems BOgIC is the controlling factor in the decision of legal
erly be iisedu? logic 15 really the Vice of the law. Logic may prop-
building u 1r; either Of two ways. First it is a valid process in
a generalifa: octrine from past eitperience. It is used to produce
eVidencc on, and the latter, logically, can be no better than the
upon which it is based. Unfortunately it is not always so
used by law
- yer and conceptions are purely
mrlalginati
nation 0:31: met} action against their exami-
fitting the pres l s. In the second place, logic is a valid process in
flincticm here ient'case into or out of accepted doctrine. The lawyer’s
of COurSe, is a s slimply to find a general or specific precedent. That,
of the quest {a 1d beginning, but It. is far from a valid termination
the aSSumption OglC'IS only a real aid it we are satisfied both with
and t e result val‘iv‘hllfh form the beginning oi the logical processes
. zation of :19, 2:3: their ending. It is ultimately a formal
but unfortunately some lawyers acce
e . . . ptSUbstance of the Judlclal process. The simple previous ex.
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pression of an idea thus occupies too large a place in the laWyer’g
world.
The truth is that with few exceptions ideas, as men, “Emmi:
their death with increasing age. One of the saddest facts of hum“
existence, however, is that the great law of inertia applies to the hu—
man mind, and nothing is so hard for most people as the mental feat
of accepting a new idea. But it is literally true that life is change and
is not static and that social existence and governmental functions
cannot be based on any principle of inertia. It is indeed surprising
that there are those who would surrender to a philosophy of fatalism
in government; who would concede that natural and social forces are
beyond the control of human intelligence; that government cannot
direct, but only retard and prohibit, or do nothing.
If necessary we must compel ourselves to shed many of our ac-
quired ideas in order to meet adequately a changing civilization.
Except a man forsake his Father’s and Mother’s ideas he cannot be
a disciple of Democracy. He may make a good aristocrat, but he
cannot really accept Democracy for what it is—a social attempt at
orderly progress. Progress, of course, is at best a prediction to be
tried by experimentation. We “know,” and can “know,” no more as
to what constitutes “progress” than we can know any other thing
necessarily based on future experience.
III
Lawyers, too, like others, are commonly committed to the dogma
that we acquire wisdom with age or experience. The latter, however,
is only really directly valuable if the identical or very nearly identical
problem again presents itself for solution. This seldom, if ever,
happens and the qualities most needed (especially in times like these)
are not wisdom, so called, and past experiences. Those in themselves
are obviously inadequate, however valuable they may be as precedents
or analogies or points of departure. What we need are the qualities
of vision, tolerance, and courageous experiment. “To the extent that
we are reluctant or unwilling to resort to judicious social expm'lm‘mts
to that extent we postpone social progress and perpetuate our
1gnorance.” We must abandon the notion that we are wise enough
to manufacture a workable social scheme purely out of our mental
processes and in total disregard of present experience, or that “W
Will take care of themselves.” Our beliefs and Opinions 31" ‘ very
insecure 13335 1113011 which to rest ultimately the social Wdf‘fe' pf:
‘C‘Jlarly in the face of indisputable evidence that they are mull '
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Lawyers, like others, also are easily alarmed. They do not hesitate
to disinter the time—worn argument of alarm, “Where does this lead
us ?” The short answer is that it leads us just as far as we wish to go
and no further. Edmund Burke said: “We stop very short of the
principles upon which we support any given part of our constitution
or even of the whole of it together. This is but what is natural and
proper. All government, indeed every human benefit, every virtue,
and every prudent act is founded on compromise and‘barter. We
balance inconvenience, we give and take and we remit some rights
that we may enjoy others; we choose rather to be happy citizens than
subtle disputants.”
It doesn’t follow that because we do this, we must do something
further. We never have really governed our lives by logic (although
we make a pretense of doing so), and there is no need to fear that we
shall start doing so at this late date. “Man acts from adequate mo-
tives relative to his own interest and not on metaphysical specu-
lations.”
Again it should not be particularly distressing if we conclude
that many people, if not indeed most people, accept those various
errors and dogmas as “fundamental truths.” We may well shudder,
however, when we find among those people many lawyers. Because,
mind you, lawyers are superior people! At least we have a consti-
tutional doctrine to that effect.
IV
It must be remembered, however, that after all the'réle which
the lawyer has called upon himself to fill is diliicult. The standard he
has set for himself is high. It may be that it is impossible of con-
sistent attainment. Indeed he must struggle even against those who
are the most prone to emphasize his failures.
But lawyers believe, at least, that their occupation is a profession,
and the only possible distinction between a business and a profession
is that the first is individualistic while the second is socially minded.
A business man has only to look to his profits and let his competi-
tOFS and all others look to their interests. A professional man meas-
tires his conduct not only by his own individual needs and ambitions
1“ by the social consequences of his action. Professional men are
Constantly called upon to sacrifice personal interest for the common
300d, and perhaps we have reached the point where others can safely
called upon to follow.
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The common disaster lies in the obvious difficulty of acting so-
cially (professionally) in an individualistic society. A lawyer's ideals
are in very truth at complete odds with his environment. Those who
criticize him the most, Who make the most of his frequent failures,
are those who add to his already impossible situation by their own
inconsistent demands that their own individual interests are beyond
social control.
What appears to be an irreconcilable confiict, however, finally re-
duces itself to a battle which is won or lost only after the confiict has
been actually met by the empirical test of action. There are many
irreconcilable conflicts in nature, the one between free will and deter-
minism being a most illuminating example. Both principles are in
truth valid, although in the test of action one or the other must be a
decisive force.
So it is here. The professional ideal is simply tested, and the
battle won or lost in the field of everyday action. The character of
lawyers is finally the determining factor as to whether or not the
conflict is won or lost. Is superiority a fancy or a reality? Assuming
that we are committed to a doctrine of lawyer supremacy, what ele-
ments insure its practical success?
The start surely is with a decent concept of professional charac-
ter. Then if the concept be sufficient, the determining factor certainly
is the successful development of professional character.
There is little dissent, at least among lawyers, upon the concept
of professional character. It may be even that it has. been idealized
a little too much. But it is settled by judicial decision that character
in an attorney is something far beyond mere physical morality. At-
torneys have been disbarred because of ignorance where clients have
been harmed by their actions. The standard of intellectual attainment
is not high and it is very narrow, but it is there.
When one gets out into the fields Where lawyers execute the
doctrine of judic1a1 supremacy, either as advocate or judge, the con-
cept Of PrOfessmnal character certainly broadens. Common decency
and some intellectual attainment are assumed. But the additional
requirements have not been so obvious. The principal requirement
repudiated. Professional
ary decent character plus a
plus a scientific attitude, a social viewpoint.
nt can a lawyer maintain his superiority as
. our experiment in social democracy. That is
true even in the cases where on the face of it the attorney is dealing
Only with that equipme
the directing genius of
.;.1.__'I' . 53"“J"-' -.
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only with his client’s interests. There can no longer be even in theory
a clear-cut dividing line between individual interests and public inter-
ests. Each is limited by the other.
V
The development of a professional character which will stand the
test of action in modern life must obviously be delegated to the law
schools. Practically all lawyers are trained in law schools. Character
is set during the school period. If the school fails there is no second
chance.
The kind of school and the form and substance of legal education
are of controlling importance. On the first score the commercial law
school is doomed. It is physically impossible to keep one’s head and
heart in the atmosphere of idealism and in the cash register at the
same time. The latter too often measures the former, and inevita-
bly so.
Assuming a law school whose policies are not dictated by finan—
cial expediency, there are immense problems left. The form of pro-
fessional conduct is of relatively little importance. Little time need
be given then to the teaching of “legal ethics” in the sense in which
that phrase has previously been used. The form and substance of
the instruction as to law and the judicial process are the determining
factors in the result. '
Much legal education in the past has been entirely formalistic,
even ritualistic. Lawyers learned much which was not so. Law
teachers were dogmatists, with the result that lawyers were far from
anything else—for “taught law is tough law.” It is true that law can-
“Pt be scientific in the same sense that chemistry or physics is scien-
:fc- Those can measure “truth” by experience because they seek
to ::P11a}n nature and man. Law attempts to regulate man and not
that E1:)xaunh1m. Legal rules cannot be “proved” or “disproved.” But
a Vast iEffirlence—the success and failure of legal rules—should have
is Obvi0u uence on the formulation and administration of legal rules
Past is ir: Legal rules are thus experiments and not hnalities. The
the notionpogtant but inconcluswe. I repeat that we must abandon
0rd er'sim It at we can manufacture a satisfactory legal and soared
P Y out of our past and our mental processes Without regard
to . . .
present exPerience (including present ideas and ideals). An at-
tern . .
Weir): therefore, must be made to train lawyers With a broad-minded
hon - -- -
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fessional character which will really make the lawyer superior. Only
then will he be able properly to fulfill his role of constitutional
supremacy.
Such a lawyer will have learned that there are distinctions be-
tween his beliefs, his opinions, and his knowledge. He will have
learned that his usefulness is in an inverse ratio to the number of
things he “knows” which are not so. He will be more than a “subtle
disputant,” aware of the fact that the “vice of the law is logic.” All
this simply because he will have some appreciation of the significance
of social existence and his proper place in it, and because finally he
will have learned that tolerance is the highest of the virtues, particu-
larly in public affairs. Law will have become a “science” in the only
sense in which it can be a science.
This is no revolution. It is simply an added emphasis on what all
liberally and constructively minded lawyers and citizens have always
accepted as desirable. But it is certain that little real progress can
be made, if indeed the present position even can be maintained, un-
less there is accorded the law schools the active sympathy and‘ sup-
port of the general public, which after all has a very real, immediate,
and constitutional interest in the problems of legal education.
